Fort Mifflin

28th October 1777
I have already written to you upon the Subject of my Fears respecting this Post.1 I repeat that if the Enemy attempt it by way of storm and come provided with Fascines, Plank, Ladders, etc., 300 Men lost in a circumference of 1200 Paces cannot hinder them from penetrating, especially if they make false Attacks, and a real one in silence—You know this language is not dictated by Fear, but arises from a Sense of the importance of this Post. It is in vain to multiply works—of what avail are Fortifications undefended by Men.
The Galleys 15 which ought to be a Security to us are absolutely useless—they have withdrawn to the Jersey Shore—the Channel between us and Province Island is perfectly clear and if the Enemy choose to make a descent here as I have no doubt they do. We cannot hinder them. They may have two Projects one to take us by Storm and the other to open Trenches in the Island itself at the Extremity of Old ferry bank ... we can hinder neither, but I am most afraid of the first. You know that the Fort has only weak Ditches and Palisades. The former are soon fill'd with Fascines, the latter easily cut away, and the Fort laid open. The Bombs have destroyed one of our Block houses. We depend upon a few Militia for the management of our Artillery, and the greatest part of it is useless for want of hands. Notwithstand such weakness we shall do all that can be expected of brave men—I have proposed to set fire to the Magasine in case they should penetrate and blow up altogether—but this is a desperate Resolution.
—Washington Papers, roll

Engineers of Independence

1. 1. Fleury to Washington, 26 October 1777, roll 45, Washington Papers.

Oct. 16, 1777
The whole Front of the Fort now attacked is surrounded by Palisadoes, the Bank which ought to mask it is too low to cover it from the Battery placed on the opposite bank at the distance of 500 Yards—we might when the Enemy were quiet have raised this Causeway, clear'd the Ditche of the ... Earth, and have secured our Inclosure if not from Ricochet at least from horisontal Shot—we might have arm'd our Battery (assailable in all points) by a sloped fraise work placed in a Ditch dug at low water in the Gravel—we might have added to the Fort an interior Inclosure of Earth and Blinds, in order to renew the Conflict with the Enemy in case they should posses themselves of the first—we might have made Loop-holes in the Barracks and Windows—Fougasses constructed in the manner of double Coffers or Lodgements—we might have raised Epaulements against the Cannon which might rake our place of Arms—and have formed Blinds to shelter us from Bombs and smaller shells—All this might have been done while the Enemy were intent upon their works which should have been destroy'd ... but hands were wanting and now that we could have more to execute the same works under the Enemys Cannon, we have none—for what are 150 Men tired out with watching and Labours—had not this extreme Weakness prevented you might have heard of night Sallies in armed Boats to ruin the Enemys Works and spike their Cannon.
Since my arrival I have seconded as much as possible the zeal of Colonel [Samuel] Smith. We have raised three Traverses upon the grand Battery to guard against the Enemys Richochet that he has cover'd the Powder Magasin with Blinds, and if we can to night we shall raise the Bank on the front attack'd to mask our Pallisadoes with this kind of a cover'd way.
Our greatest Uneasiness is occasioned by the dread of Surprise—the Channel between Pennsylvania and the Fort is altogether clear; the Galleys have removed the Jersey Side out of all distance for annoying the Enemy and seconding us. The nights are darken'd by Fogs and all our Garrison must be on the watch to avoid being carried by Storm—I am ignorant of the Plans of His Excellency [Washington]. I scarcely allow myself to form conjectures but if the thing required be to hinder the Enemy from reaching Philadelphia to cut off their Communication altogether, even in flat bottom Boats,—which might pass the Chevaux de frise and in a Channel at 1400 yds. dist. from Redbank (which Place is a mile and a quarter and five perches from Fort Island) our Battery alone can answer ... what can you expect from Shot thrown at the distance of 1400 Yards against a moveable object? Red Bank ... is to serve as a Retreat for our Garrison—but it wants no Retreat—its Refuge is in its Pallisades and its Courage. Let it be reinforced—let it be [?] put out of the reach of Storms—and the Enemy will not be so soon Masters of the River—but we must have men—works—and be enabled to make vigorous Sallies.
Position of the enemy—16 Octob: at noon—The Enemy have raised 4 Batteries—One a little behind the Fort upon the Bank which extends along the River at about 500 yards distance from us—a second at the PestHouse still more in our rear and at the distance of 2000 Yds.—a third at the Brick House (of which I spoke to His Excellency) situated on the rising ground opposite the Fort at 1 mile 28 perches from us. A fourth a little lower than the Fort—upon the Bank abovementioned there are besides two Batteries at the Mouth of Schuylkil which have made our Ships remove to a greater distance—there are 2 or 3 Mortars and some large Canon in these batteries—the Direction of their Fire was at first uncertain, but they have rectified it, and it appears to be ... intended for our Powder Magasin.
—Washington Papers, roll 44.

Engineers of Independence

Head Quarters, Valley Forge, February 12, 1778.

Dear Sir: The Congress, so long ago, as the 30th. November last, directed me to have an inquiry into the Causes of the losses of Fort Mifflin1 upon the Delaware and Fort Montgomery upon Hudson's River. The peculiar situation of the Army has hindered me from attending to this matter before this time.

As most of the principal Officers up the North River, were immediately concerned in the defence of Fort Montgomery, or eventually so by being very near it, there cannot, in my opinion, be a sufficient number proper to compose a Court found upon the spot. It is therefore my intention to send three at least from this Army, and it is my wish that you should be one and act as president upon the occasion, if your health will permit you to attend. I shall therefore, be glad to hear from you upon the subject, that I may, either proceed to fill up the Commission for you, or appoint another, if your health should not be sufficiently established to go thro' the business. It is my wish to have this inquiry carried on, not only in obedience to the Resolve of Congress, but for other Reasons which I need not explain to you. It is, besides, impatiently expected by the Gentlemen in the State of New York, who are in hopes that some beneficial consequences will result from it. You are particularly well acquainted with many Circumstances relating to the situation of matters in that quarter and therefore more capable of conducting the inquiry than any other officer. I shall only add one Reason more, to induce you to strain a point upon this occasion; which is, that the scarcity of Genl. Officers is already so great, that supposing one as proper as yourself, I could not spare him without injury to the Service. I shall expect an answer by return of the express. I am etc.2

1. 1. The resolves of November 28, which were forwarded to Washington in a letter of November 30. See Washington's letter to Congress, February 8, 1778, ante.
2. 2. The draft is in the writing of Tench Tilghman.

Valley Forge, February 8--14, 1778.

Sir: I have been duly honored with your Favor of the 3d Instant and with its Inclosure.

As General McDougall's late severe illness and present feeble state, will not permit him to proceed on the intended incursion into Canada, Baron de Kalb will follow the Marquis agreeable to his wish and the direction of Congress.

According to the promise contained in my last, I take the liberty of transmitting you Copies of such Letters, as have lately passed between Genl. Howe and myself.

February 12.

Since writing the above, I have received another Letter from General Howe of the 5th. Instant, Copy of which and of my Answer you have also inclosed.1 By these you will perceive, that he has proposed a General exchange of prisoners and that I have acceded to it. I have written to Mr. Boudinot, Commissary in this line, requiring his return to Camp, and shall give him directions to pursue the most speedy measures for accomplishing this business, so interesting to the unhappy Officers and Men in General Howe's hands, and to the cause of Humanity. There are some other matters, as you will discover, which I could not enter upon.

The situation of the Affairs of the Army has not till lately made it convenient to go into the inquiry, directed by the Resolve of the 28th of November of the losses of the Forts Montgomery and Clinton, in the state of New York and of Fort Mifflin in the Delaware. With respect to the two former, it happens, that almost all the principal Officers acting in that quarter, were in some way or other so far concerned in the affair, as to make them improper for prosecuting the inquiry. I therefore propose to send Officers from this Army: If his health will permit, I should wish General McDougall to preside. His thorough knowledge of those posts and all their connexions, qualifies him in a peculiar manner for the purpose. I have written to him on the subject.

With respect to Fort Mifflin, the inquiry involves very extensive considerations, and more or less affects almost all the General Officers in this Army, whose advice and concurrence in the measures taken, make them in some degree parties. The mode in my opinion, most unexceptionable to be pursued is for Congress, to authorise a Committee of their own body, or to delegate any other persons they may chuse to intrust, not connected with the operations of this Army, to go into the business.

February 14.

Your Several favors of the 7th and that of the 8th Inst. were duly received yesterday evening.

As soon as circumstances will admit, I shall appoint a Court Martial in the case directed, and shall notify the parties concerned of the same.

The Oath which Congress have prescribed to be taken by the Officers of the Army, I shall publish in General Orders and the mode how it is to be done with directions about the certificates.

I shall extend Lt Colo. Dyer's2 Furlough to the first of April as required. I have the honor, etc.3

1. 1. According to Charles Thomson's indorsement, these inclosures were: Sir William Howe's letters to Washington, Jan. 8, 18, 19, and Feb. 5, 1778; Washington's letters to Howe, Jan. 8, 20, 30, and Feb. 10, 1778. All of these letters, except that from Howe to Washington, January 8, are in the Washington papers.
2. 2. Lieut. Col. Thomas Dyer, of the Eighth Connecticut Regiment. He resigned Apr. 11, 1778.
3. 3. In the writing of Robert Hanson Harrison.

Head Quarters near the Gulph, December 14, 1777.

Sir: On Thursday Evening I had the Honor to receive your Favor of the 8th Inst. From the several Letters which have lately passed between Genl. Howe and myself, I am fully convinced, that any propositions by me, to release the Baron St. Ouary1 from captivity, either by an exchange or on parole, would be unavailing. In his Letter of the he [Sir William Howe] has explicitly stated his sentiments, and has declared himself, to be utterly against a partial Exchange. The situation of the Baron, thro' the interest and acquaintance of the Marquis Fayette with [a Mr. Kirkpatrick] an Officer in the Guards, is much more comfortable than that of any of our Officers, who are Prisoners, he being on Parole in the City, whilst they are All confined in the State House. I do not know that it is the practice in Europe, not to consider Volunteers as Prisoners. I am inclined to believe, that it is not, and that they are generally held as such, unless the contrary is particularly stipulated by Cartel. However this may be, they have been held in the present contest on both sides on the footing of other prisoners and exchanged as such. Besides this, I fear, that a proposition calculated for the peculiar benefit of the Baron, would be lily received by our Unhappy Officers, who have been much longer in confinement, whose sufferings are far greater than his, and who claim a right to exchange in due course.

The Inquiries directed in the Resolutions contained in your Letter of the 30th Ulto., respecting the loss of the Forts in the Highlands and of Fort Mifflin, I shall order to be made, as soon as circumstances will admit.2 These However it is probable will not be effected in a short time, from the Situation of our Affairs and inevitable necessity.

On Thursday morning we marched from our Old Encampment and intended to pass the Schuylkill at Madisons Ford,3 where a Bridge had been laid across the River. When the first Division and a part of the Second had passed, they found a body of the Enemy, consisting, from the best accounts we have been able to obtain, of Four Thousand Men, under Lord Cornwallis possessing themselves of the Heights on both sides of the Road leading from the River and the defile called the Gulph, which I presume, are well known to some part of your Honble. Body. This unexpected Event obliged such of our Troops, as had crossed to repass and prevented our getting over till the succeeding night. This Manoeuvre on the part of the Enemy, was not in consequence of any information they had of our movement, but was designed to secure the pass whilst they were foraging in the Neighbouring Country; they were met in their advance, by General Potter with part of the Pennsylvania Militia, who behaved with bravery and gave them every possible opposition, till they were obliged to retreat from their superior numbers. Had we been an Hour sooner, or had had the least information of the measure, I am persuaded we should have given his Lordship a fortunate stroke or obliged him to have returned, without effecting his purpose, or drawn out all Genl Howe's force to have supported him. Our first intelligence was that it was all out. He collected a good deal of Forage and returned to the City, the Night we passed the River. No discrimination marked his proceedings. All property, whether Friends or Foes that came in their way was seized and carried off.4

Enclosed is a Copy of a Letter from Genl. Burgoyne, by which you will perceive, he requests leave to embark his Troops at Rhode Island or at some place in the sound, and in case this cannot be granted, that he may be allowed, with his Suite to go there and return from thence to England. His first proposition, as I have observed upon a former occasion is certainly inadmissible and for reasons obvious to himself. As to the Second which respects the departure of himself and Suite, Congress will be pleased to determine upon it and favor me with their Sentiments by the first Opportunity, that I may know what answer to give him.5 I learn from Mr. Griffin, who has just come from Boston, that this Gentlemen either holds, or professes to hold very different Ideas of our power, than what he formerly entertained; That, without reserve he has said it would be next to impossible for Britain to succeed in her views, and that he should with freedom declare his Sentiments accordingly on his Arrival in England, and seemed to think the recognition of our Independence by the King and Parliament an Eligible measure, under a Treaty of Commerce upon a large and extensive Scale. How far these professions are founded in Sincerity, it is not easy to determine; But if they are what a mighty change. While I am on the subject of Mr. Burgoyne and his Army, I would submit it to Congress, whether it will not be right and reasonable that all Expences, incurred on their Account for Provisions &c. should be paid and satisfied, previous to their embarkation and departure. I mean, by an Actual deposit of the Money. Unless this is done, there will be little reason to suppose, that it will ever be paid. They have failed, that is the Nation, in other instances, as I have been told, after liquidating their Accounts and giving the fullest Certificates and we cannot expect that they will keep better faith with us, than with Others. The payment too, I should apprehend, ought to be in Coin, as it will enable us to administer some relief to our unfortunate Officers and Men who are in Captivity.6

December 15.

Your Favor of the 11th Current,7 with its Inclosure came to hand Yesterday. Congress seem to have taken for granted a Fact, that is really not so. All the Forage for the Army has been constantly drawn from Bucks and Philadelphia Counties and those parts most contiguous to the City, insomuch that it was nearly exhausted and intirely so in the Country below our Camp. From these too, were obtained all the Supplies of flour that circumstances would admit of. The Millers, in most instances, were unwilling to grind, either from their disaffection or from motives of fear. This made the supplies less than they otherwise might have been, and the Quantity which was drawn from thence, was little besides what the Guards, placed at the Mills, compelled them to manufacture. As to Stock, I do not know that much was had from thence, nor do I know that any considerable supply could have been had. I confess, I have felt myself greatly embarrassed with respect to a vigorous exercise of Military power. An Ill placed humanity perhaps and a reluctance to give distress may have restrained me too far. But these were not all. I have been well aware of the prevalent jealousy of military power, and that this has been considered as an Evil much to be apprehended even by the best and most sensible among us. Under this Idea, I have been cautious and wished to avoid as much as possible any Act that might improve it. However Congress may be assured, that no exertions of mine as far as circumstances will admit shall be wanting to provide our own Troops with Supplies on the one hand, and to prevent the Enemy from them on the other. At the same time they must be apprized, that many Obstacles have arisen to render the former more precarious and difficult than they usually were from a change in the Commissary's department at a very critical and interesting period. I should be happy, if the Civil Authority in the Several States thro' the recommendations of Congress, or their own mere will, seeing the necessity of supporting the Army, would always adopt the most spirited measures, suited to the end. The people at large are governed much by Custom. To Acts of Legislation or Civil Authority they have been ever taught to yield a willing obedience without reasoning about their propriety. On those of Military power, whether immediate or derived originally from another Source, they have ever looked with a jealous and suspicious Eye.

I am extremely sorry for your Indisposition and wishing you the earliest relief from your painful disorder,8 I have the honor etc.9

1. 1. On December 3 Congress resolved that Washington request the release of Baron St. Ouary, "a gallant gentleman from France, engaged as a volunteer in the service of the United States, ... lately, by the fortune of war, made prisoner by the British."
2. 2. The draft at this point has the following, which is lined out: "At the same time, I wish Congress had taken these matters under their direction. Whether the loss of the former could have been prevented I can not determine, but I am persuaded it will be found on the strictest inquiry that every aid was given to support the latter that the situation of the army would authorize and that the Officers and Garrison employed in its defence. did all that Men could do to maintain it. They sustained a severe and disagreeable Siege; they fought, they fell and the post was not quitted till it was a mass of Ruins."
3. 3. Matsons Ford, at the Gulph.
4. 4. Ford quotes a letter from John Laurens to his father (December 23) giving an account of these movements: "When we marched from Whitemarsh Camp and were in the act of crossing the Schuylkill, we received intelligence that the enemy were advancing on this side of the river ... and were driving Potter's militia before them. Two regiments of this corps, however, are said to have conducted themselves extremely well, and to have given the enemy no small annoyance as they advanced. General Sullivan was Master General of the day ... being uncertain as to the number of the enemy, and dreading their advance in force, when part of the army should be on one side of the river and part on the other, he ordered those troops to recross and our bridge to be rendered impassable. Notice of this was sent to the Commander in chief, and when he arrived, parties of the enemy were seen on the commanding heights on this side of the river. ... Some pronounced hastily that the enemy had received intelligence of our march ... and that they were prepared to oppose our passage. Genl. Washington, who never since I have been in his family, has passed a false judgment on such points, gave it as his opinion that the party in view were foragers; that the meeting was accidental, but, however, the enemy might avail themselves of this unexpected discovery, and might draw as much advantage from it as if the rencounter had been premeditated. The intelligence was received that the enemy were retiring in great haste, but it did not appear satisfactory, and the army was ordered to march to Swedes Ford, three or four miles higher up the river and encamp with the right to the Schuylkill. The next morning the want of provisions--I could weep tears of blood when I say it--the want of provisions rendered it impossible to march. We did not march till the evening of that day. Our ancient bridge, an infamous construction, which in many parts obliged the men to march by Indian file, was restored, and a bridge of waggons made over the Swedes Ford, but fencerails from necessity being substituted to plank, and furnishing a very unstable footing. This last served to cross a trifling number of troops. As the event turned out, Genl. Sullivan's retrograde movement was unspeakably unlucky, If we had persevered in crossing in the first instance, or if we had even crossed in the evening of the first day, the flower of the British army must have fallen a sacrifice to superior numbers."
5. 5. On December 17 Congress resolved that General Washington be directed to inform General Burgoyne that Congress would not receive nor consider any proposition for indulgence or altering the terms of the convention of Saratoga, unless immediately directed to their own body. By a resolve of December 1 Congress had already decided to reject any proposal for embarking the convention troops from any place other than that stipulated by the terms of surrender at Saratoga.
6. 6. The Saratoga convention provided that the British troops on their march to Boston were to be supplied with provisions at the same rate of rations as the troops of Gates's army. Gates was paying paper money for his supplies, which had depreciated at this time about two-thirds of its face value. Washington's suggestion to exact payment in coin for what the British consumed was hard driving; but in view of the generous counterfeiting of Continental paper money, indulged in by the British, which counterfeiting had been a real factor in depreciating the Continental money, it is a nice question to decide. Congress was already considering the question, and on December 19 ordered that the accounts of all provisions and other necessaries which already have been, or which hereafter may be supplied by the public to prisoners in the power of these States, shall be discharged by either receiving from the British commissary of prisoners, or any of his agents, provisions or other necessaries, equal in quality and kind to what have been supplied, or the amount thereof in gold and silver, at the rate of 4 s. 6 d. for every dollar of the currency of these States, and that all these accounts be liquidated and discharged, previous to the release of any prisoners to whom provisions or other necessaries shall have been supplied. Burgoyne protested and claimed the convention was infringed by such a demand. He appealed to Howe, and Howe then agreed to an exchange of prisoners, but later difficulties developed.
7. 7. This letter was one of December 12, a copy of which is entered in the "President's Letter Book" in the Papers of the Continental Congress. The resolve alluded to is that (December 10) directing the removal of all stock and provisions beyond the reach of the enemy.
8. 8. Laurens resigned as President of Congress on Dec. 12, 1777, on the ground of ill health, but Congress did not accept the resignation, and he continued as President until Dec. 9, 1778.
9. 9. The draft is in the writing of Robert Hanson Harrison.

Head Quarters, White Marsh, December 10, 1777.

Dear Sir: I had the pleasure of receiving yours of the 21st. Ulto. on Wednesday last; but such has been the Situation of the two Armies since, that I have not had an opportunity of answering it before this time.

Genl. Howe had been for several days making great preparations for a move, which they did not scruple to say was intended against this Army, threatning to drive us beyond the mountains. On Thursday Evening last they marched out and took post in the morning upon Chesnut Hill, three miles in our Front. In the Evening they shifted their Ground to our left, from which I thought they meant an attack upon that quarter. But after manoevering about us for some days, they suddenly decamped on Monday afternoon and marched back to Philada., in the most hasty manner. I detached light parties after them, but they were not able to come up with them.

I hope the exertions of our Friends in your House of assembly will be attended with the desired effect. Unless we can fill our Regiments against the next Campaign, I very much fear that all our past labours will have been in vain, for unless a War with France should divert the attention of Great Britain, I am convinced she will strain every nerve to make up for the disappointments and losses of this Campaign. And altho, from many of our late accounts, it should seem as if a War was inevitable, we ought not to count upon that score, but make our preparations as if we were to depend solely upon our own Bottoms.

The question you ask respecting the strength of our Army is of so important a nature, that altho I have the fullest confidence in you, I dare not trust the particulars to paper for fear of accidents. Thus much I can assure you, that our numbers have been always much exaggerated and that the Enemy have constantly exceeded our Continental Force. The Battalions of the other States are in point of deficiency much upon a footing with yours and you may judge from thence, how much we stand in need of Recruits.

The Officers who commanded at Red Bank and Fort Mifflin were Colo. Green of Rhode Island and Lt. Colo. Smith of Maryland. They did all that brave men could do, but the posts at length fell, being over powered by dint of superior force. They however confess that the long and unexpected opposition which they received broke in upon their plans for the remainder of the Campaign. I am &ca.1

1. 1. The draft is in the writing of Tench Tilghman.

Head Quarters, Whitemarsh, December 2, 1777.

Sir: I was yesterday favd. with yours of the 23d Novemr. and am glad to find that you were upon your guard against any attempt of Genl. Burgoyne to endeavour to change the place of embarkation. No Transports have yet sailed from the Delaware for the purpose of carrying the Troops to Europe, nor do I hear that any have gone from New York. I can only attribute this delay to want of provision for the Voyage. Bread we know is exceedingly scarce among them.

By Resolve of Congress of the 5th. Novemr. (Copy of which I perceive by the Resolve itself has been transmitted to you) you are directed, with a certain part of the northern Army and the assistance of the Militia of New York and the Eastern States, to attempt the recovery of the posts upon the North River from the Enemy, and to put them, if recovered, in the best posture of defence. The Enemy having themselves vacated Forts Montgomery and Clinton while the Resolve was in agitation, but of which the Congress could not at the time be informed, the first part falls of course; but the last deserves our most serious attention, as upon the possession of the North River depends the security of all the upper part of the Government of New York and the communication between the Eastern, middle and southern States. It is also the Quarter in which the Enemy will probably attempt a diversion in the Spring, as, from the small force remaining in Canada, there is not a possibility of their doing any thing on that side till very late in the Campaign, if at all.

My not having heard from you, what Steps you have taken towards carrying the Resolve, for repairing the old Works or building new, into execution, or when you might be expected down into that part of the Country, has made me hitherto delay recalling Genl. Putnam from the command. But I beg leave to urge to you the necessity of your presence in that quarter as speedily as possible for I fear few or no measures have yet been taken towards putting matters in a proper train for carrying on these important Works.

Genl. George Clinton will necessarily be employed in the affairs of his Government, but I have wrote to him for, and I am certain he will call for and contribute all the Aid that the State of New York can possibly afford. You are vested by the Resolve of Congress to demand a proportionable Share of Assistance from the Eastern States.

I observe, by a paragraph in the Fishkill paper of some days later date than your Letter, that the Enemy had evacuated Ticonderoga, and Independence. If this should have happened, it will not only releive your attention from that object, but it will enable you to draw the Force which you might have intended to watch the operations of the Enemy in that quarter, lower down the River.

Lieutt. Colo. Willet, who was here a few days ago, mentioned that Gansevoort's Regiment was at Fort Schuyler, and Van Schaicks at Schenectady. He seemed of opinion, from his knowledge of that Country, and from the disposition of the Indians since your success to the Northward, that a much less Garrison than the whole of Gansevoorts Regiment would be Sufficient for Fort Schuyler, and that the remainder of that and Van Schaicks might be brought down the Country. Your own knowledge and Judgment will undoubtedly point out the propriety or safety of such a measure. I barely mention Colo. Willets opinion of the matter.

You must be so well convinced of the importance of the North River, that nothing more need be said to induce you to set about the security of it with the greatest vigour. I some time ago sent up Lt. Colo. La Radiere to Fishkill to assist in carrying on the Works; but if he, with the Gentlemen who was before with you, should not be sufficient, I can send up another who I beleive is a Master of his profession.

Genl. Howe has withdrawn himself close within his lines, which extend from the upper Ferry upon Schuylkill to Kensington upon Delaware. They consist of a Chain of strong Redoubts, connected by Abattis. We have reconnoitered them well, but find it impossible to attack them while defended by a forcefully equal to our own in Continental Troops. The Reinforcement from New York unluckily arriving before ours from the Northward, it was out of my power to afford adequate relief to Fort Mifflin, which fell after a most gallant defence of seven Weeks. The Works upon the Jersey Shore, which were not tenable, after the Reduction of Fort Mifflin, were evacuated, as it would have been impossible to have supported the Garrison there. We have not yet determined upon a position for the Army during the Winter. That Situation will undoubtedly be most eligible, which will afford best cover to the Troops, and will at the same time cut off the Enemy from Resources of provisions, which they may probably stand in need of, when the Navigation of Delaware is obstructed by the Ice. I am &ca.1

1. 1. In the writing of Tench Tilghman. The draft varies in a few minor verbal particulars from the letter sent. [N.Y.H.S.]

Camp at White Marsh 12 miles from Philadelphia,
November 26, 1777.

Dear Brother: Your letters of the 26th. of Octr. and 7th. inst. have come safe to hand; by the last it would appear that a letter which I wrote you about the 18th. of October had not reached you, which I am exceeding sorry for as, to the best of my recollection I wrote you very fully on the posture of our affairs, and should be exceedingly concerned if it should have fallen into the hands of the Enemy, or some disaffected rascal, who would make an improper use of it. In that letter which upon second thoughts I put under cover to Col. Lewis,1 open, as I had not time to write two, that he might also be apprized of our situation. I enclosed one to my sister, thanking her for the nice and elegant stockings she was obliging enough to send me, accompanied by an affectionate letter written I think in June; but which with the Stockings, never got to my hands till about the 15th. of last month. If those letters of mine to you and her, have miscarried which I shall be exceedingly sorry for; I shall be obliged to you now to thank my sister for the present, and assure her that I shall set great store by them, and will wear them for her sake.

Red Bank or Fort Mercer being little more than an aid to Fort Mifflin was evacuated about 4 days ago, upon a large body of troops being thrown over the river for the purpose of reducing it. So soon as I got information of the design, I also detached pretty largely in hopes of saving the Fort; but the Enemy having a small distance to go, and great convenience of crossing, whilst we were deficient in the latter, and had a circuitous rout to march by: it was found impracticable; and now I have only to lament my having made the detachments, as by intelligence, the Enemy are recrossing to Philadelphia, and may in our divided state fall upon us with their whole force; which would not gibe well with our present circumstances. I have however ordered them back with all possible expedition, and shall look for them in a couple of days. When they arrive, with the assistance of some of the Northern Troops, which have joined us within these few days from Genl. Gates, we shall be on a more respectable footing, than we have been the whole campaign: but unfortunately, before this junction happened the Enemy had fortified themselves so strongly that it is now impossible to attack them with the least hopes of success. They have also by removing the obstructions in the river, got up their shipping to the City and of consequence their provisions, stores &c., had the reinforcement from the Northward arrived but ten days sooner it would I think have put it in my power to have saved Fort Mifflin which defended the Cheveaux de Frieze, and consequently have rendered Philadelphia a very ineligable situation for them this winter. They have also received a reinforcement from New York, but not quite so large I believe as ours. With truth I believe I may add, that till within these few days, I have never (notwithstanding the numbers given me by the world, and which it was not my interest to contradict) had as many Men in the field, under my immediate command, as Genl. Howe has had under his; although we have fought him twice, and prevented him hitherto from obtaining other advantages than that of possessing himself of the City; which but for the eclat it is attended with, brings no solid advantage to their arms. The Militia which have been called upon in aid of our Troops; (Continental I mean) have come out in such a manner, that before you could get a second class of them, the first were always gone; by which means although the sound of them was great; you never could increase your real numbers, and strength.

The attack upon Red Bank, als. Fort Mercer, sometime ago, followed by the loss of at least 400 Hessians killed and wounded with their leader Count Donop, as also the burning of the Augusta Man of War of 64 Guns, and the Merlin Sloop of 18, is true. Indeed the number of Men lost at the Attack of Fort Mercer is said to be much more than 400. That many we are sure of. At different times during the siege of Fort Mifflin they lost many men. The above ships however were not destroyed by either Fire Rafts, or our Galleys. The first took fire by accident, and blew up. The other getting aground and apprehending danger from the explosion of the Augusta, was set fire to by the crew and abandoned, both these things though happened during the attack on the Fort.

My love attends my sister, the young married couple, and the rest of your family. My Compliments to all friends; and with sincere regard I am, etc.

P.S. I expect part of the Troops which I sent to Jerseys, back tonight, and the residue in a day or two.2

1. 1. Col. Fielding Lewis.
2. 2. The text is from a recent copy in the Washington Papers.

Head Quarters, November 23, 1777.

Sir: I have been duly honored with your Favors of the 13 and 19 Instant with their Inclosures. I am well assured Congress have not been inattentive to the Necessities of the Army, and that the deficiency in our Supplies, particularly in the Article of cloathing has arisen from the difficulty of importing on account of the Numerous Fleet, which line our Coast. However, I am persuaded that considerable relief might be drawn from the different States, were they to exert themselves properly. This I hope will be the case, as soon as they receive the pressing recommendations of Congress upon the Subject.

It has been the unvaried custom of the Enemy, from the commencement of the present Contest, to try every Artifice and device to delude the People. The Message sent thro' John Brown was calculated for this end.1 I am surprised Mr. Willing2 should suffer himself to be imposed on by such flimsy measures. He knows that there is a plain, obvious way for Genl and Lord Howe to communicate any proposals they wish to make to Congress, without the intervention of a second and third hand. But this would not suit their views. I am sorry that Mr. Brown should have been the Bearer of the Message, as from the character I have had of him, he is a worthy, well disposed Man. It has been frequently mentioned, that he had interested himself much in behalf of our Prisoners; and had afforded them every relief and comfort his circumstances would allow him to give.

I have been endeavouring to effect an Exchange of prisoners, from principles of justice and from motives of humanity; but at present I have no prospect of it. Yet Genl. Howe has assured Our Officers, it was his wish, and if it could not be done, that he should readily agree to their release on parole. The Inclosed Copies of my Letters and his Answer will shew Congress what has passed between us upon that subject, and at the same time, that I had remonstrated against the severe and cruel treatment of the Prisoners and proposed the Plan of sending in a Suitable person to inquire into the Facts, before the receipt of their Resolution. Their sufferings, I am persuaded, have been great and shocking to Humanity. (I have called upon Genl. Howe for redress and an explicit answer to my Letter of the 14th. If I do not receive One by to morrow night, with the most positive and satisfactory assurances, that a proper conduct shall be observed towards them in future, we must retaliate. However much we wish to avoid Severity and measures that bears the smallest appearance of rigour, or inhumanity.)

Inclosed you will receive a List of Sundry Officers, who have been cashiered since the Action of the 4th. Ulto. I flatter myself, that these examples, will involve many favorable and beneficial consequences. Besides these there were many more brought to trial who were acquitted. Among them Genl. Maxwell and Genl. Wayne. The former for charges against him while he commanded the Light Troops. The latter for charges against his conduct, in the Attack made on his division in the Night of the 20th of September. The result of the Court of Inquiry against Genl. Wayne, not intirely exempting him from censure in his own Opinion, he requested a Court Martial and upon a full and minute investigation of the charges against him, he was honourably acquitted and in terms of high respect.

I am sorry to inform Congress, that the Enemy are now in possession of All the Water defences. Fort Mifflin and that at Red Bank mutually depended on each Other for support, and the reduction of the former made the tenure of the latter extremely precarious, if not impracticable. After the loss of Fort Mifflin, it was found Red Bank could derive no advantages from the Gallies and Armed Vessels (they could not maintain their Station) and in case of Investiture, the Garrison could have no Supplies, no retreat, nor any hope of relief, but such as might arise from a Superior Force acting without on the rear of the Enemy and dislodging them. Under these circumstances, the Garrison was obliged to evacuate it on the night of the 20th Inst., on the approach of Lord Cornwallis, who had crossed the River from Chester with a Detachment, supposed to be about Two Thousand Men and formed a junction with the Troops lately arrived from New York and those that had been landed before at Billingsport. From Genl. Varnum's Account, I have reason to hope, that we saved Most of the Stores, except a few Heavy Cannon, however I cannot be particular in this instance. I am also to add, from the intelligence I have received, that most, if not All the Armed Vessels have been burnt by our own people, except the Gallies, One Brig and Two Sloops, which are said to have run by the City. How far this might be founded in necessity, I am not able to determine; but I suppose it was done under that Idea and an apprehension of their falling into the Enemy's hands, if they attempted to pass up the River. Upon the first information I had of Lord Cornwallis's movement, I detached Genl Huntington's Brigade to join Genl Varnum and as soon as possible Genl. Greene with his division, hoping that these with Glover's Brigade, which was on the march thro' Jersey and which I directed to file off to the left for the same purpose, and with such Militia as could be collected, would be able to defeat the Enemy's design and to preserve the Fort. But they were so rapid in their advance, that our Troops could not form a junction and arrive in time to succour the Garrison, which obliged them to withdraw. Genl Greene is still in Jersey and when Glover's Brigade joins him, if an Attack can be made on Lord Cornwallis with a prospect of success, I am persuaded it will be done. About a Hundred and Seventy of Morgans Corps are also gone to reinforce him.

Genls. Poor and Paterson with their Brigades and Colo Bailey with Learned's are now in Camp. The last arrived on Friday Evening. The Other two in the course of Yesterday. I have not yet obtained Returns of their strength but from the accounts of the Officers, they will amount in the whole to Twenty three or Twenty four Hundred rank and file. But I find many of them are very deficient in the Articles of Shoes, Stockings, Breeches and Blankets. Besides these, about 350 Men, detachments from Lee's Jackson's and Henley's Regiments, have joined me.

Yesterday Evening the Enemy burnt several Houses in the Neighbourhood of Philadelphia, and they have committed the most wanton spoil in many Others. I have the honor to be etc.3

1. 1. Brown had come out from Philadelphia and traveled through a large part of Pennsylvania before returning to the city. He "is again come out without a flag or pass from any general or officer in the service of the United States, pretending that he is charged with a verbal message to Congress from General Howe." Deeming such conduct "grounds of suspicion that he is employed by the enemy for purposes inimical to these states," Congress ordered his arrest. (See Journals of the Continental Congress, Nov. 18, 1777.)
2. 2. Thomas Willing.
3. 3. In the writing of Robert Hanson Harrison.

Head Quarters, November 19, 1777.

Dear Sir: In consequences of advices received since I wrote you last night, I have ordered Genl. Huntington to march to your assistance. You will please to direct the detachment that went first down to Fort Mifflin under the command of Colo. Smith, to return to Camp, they are in so much want of necessaries that it is impossible for them to remain longer. Let the Militia that are with you be put in the best order that they can be, I wish they had a good Officer at their Head to arrange them properly. I am &ca.

P.S. It would not be amiss to collect all the Militia you can in the Country adjacent.1

1. 1. The draft is in the writing of Tench Tilghman.