Fort Mifflin

Philadelphia, 7 September 1777
... It is evident that from the part which the ennemy have taken of making a descent in Cesepeak bay, the object the least pressing is the defense of the Delaware.
This being supposed, it is clear that the greatest attention ought to be directed to defend as well as possible, the Route which the Enemy have determined upon, by their landing in Chesapeak.
It is certain that fixing on this spot to land [Head of Elk], instead of Mark's hook (which General Gates, Mifflin, and myself thought they would chuse) will encrease considerably the Posts, which in proportion as they advance in the Country, they will be oblig'd to establish to keep up a Communication with their fleet. But the greatest disadvantage attending this, gives not however an entire certainly against the success of their march to Philadelphia, which I always judged and declared, since my arrival here, to be the true object of their Campaign.

To ensure, as much as possible, the success of this Campaign, it is necessary not to be merely contented with securing the Position of Wilmington, where his Excellency has very wisely thought proper to collect his first Efforts.
However strong this position may be supposed by nature, or may be rendered by Art; it appears to me, after what I have heard, that it will be possible for the enemy to pass it on the flank, or perhaps force it; considering especially the small number of Artillery belonging to his Excellency's army.
It appears to me then prudent for Congress to think of providing beforehand for their army, another fortyfied Position, which may secure the army in case they are obliged to abandon the first, and where they may collect new force against an enemy, whom the first success may render more audacious; more especially as Schuylkill is the only considerable river that impedes their March to Philadelphia; and that this River offers at Grays-ferry a Passage which no officer can (I should think) propose to defend.
For this purpose, I offer again my service and that of my officers; in hopes that there will result from it an opportunity of our being in action, which the delay of Congress in pronouncing definitively upon our existence in the service of the United States, always removes at a distance, and which probably we might wait for in vain at the forts on the Delaware; at least before our return in France, should this take place. If the Congress consent to the proposition which I make, to prepare a fortified Camp between Wilmington and Philadelphia, I beg them [First] to communicate this proposition to his Excellency General Washington.
[Second] To give me, as a principal cooperator, General Mifflin, who knows perfectly well this country; who has a very great ascendant over the Inhabitants, by whom the works would be executed and whose great activity and penetration I have had occasion to observe.
[Third] To bring forward, as soon as possible, the remainder of the fifty two pieces brought in the Amphitrite, of which twelve alone are in the northern army, ten, within these few weeks, at the army of his Excellency General Washington; the rest in Springfield, and, at other Places on the east side of Hudson's River.
These thirty remaining pieces of the said fifty two, will be so much the more necessary, as artillery is the foundation of all defensive war; and that of these thirty pieces, there are twenty one which being of a greater length than the others, and even any pieces in the army, are for that reason better for defending the intrenchments ....
-Ford, "Defences of Phila-
delphia," Pennsylvania
Magazine 18:334-37.

COUDRAY CALLS FOR ACCELERATION OF THE DELAWARE RIVER FORTIFICATIONS
August 6, 1777
... It is necessary to procure some remedy for the present weakness of the first line, by putting ourselves in a State of protecting the second and of giving thereby time to the army to arrive.
I offer to continue in this respect my care and that of the commissioned and non Commissioned Officers who attend me; but if his Excellency intends that their care should not be useless, and that an invincible disgust should not succeed the most ardent zeal, it is absolutely necessary to cause a change in the conduct, which has been observed hitherto, and to accelerate the slowness of the Civil and Military administration, to which the Congress addressed us, to procure the means of execution.
It is necessary ... that the Honourable Congress themselves order without delay. 1st. A Thousand effective Workmen every day for Billingsport who are to work on holy days, and Sundays, under the proper direction of the Engineers whom I have there. 2nd. The necessary tools, as well for these Workmen, as for my Artillery Workmen, whom I shall employ to construct the Batteries, and to repair the Carriages intended either for this or Mifflin Fort in the actual circumstances; those that I keep at Billingsport and here for this purpose having not yet been able in spite of my repeated solicitations to obtain this month past neither all the tools they want nor even Clothes. 3rd. 200 other Workmen every day at Fort Mifflin and an hundred at Red bank under the same conditions with the former. Provided this request be granted, I engage to put these three places in a State of defence in the course of this Month. Viz., to be defended Billingsport with 400 Men and 80 Cannoniers; Fort Mifflin with 600 and 500 [50?] Cannoniers, Red bank with 200 Men and 20 Cannoniers.

During the same time, I shall employ the rest of my Engineers to execute suitably to the examination of the five places of encampment to be taken between Marcus Hook and Philadelphia ....
I ask for these Engineers no other assistance, besides the horses, and a Man to serve them and carry their instruments ....
-Washington Papers, roll 25.

COUDRAY'S OBSERVATIONS ON THE DELAWARE RIVER DEFENSES
To the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council.
July 17771
Fort at Billingsport
1. As to the Situation, it is well-chosen, it commands the River in the narrowest Part I have seen, and is the most capable of Defence.
2. As to the Plan or Projection, it is very bad. The Object in View ought to have been to defend the Chain of Chevaux de Frize, which bar the River. For that Purpose 30 or 40 Cannon, well placed, ~ould have been sufficient. The Edge of the Scarp would have afforded room enough; it was therefore necessary to shut the Gorge of the Battery, so that the Enemy might be obliged to land and open Trenches, in order to take Possession of it. ...
Besides the Length of Time, which the Plan of this Work would require in the present situation of Affairs, another Inconvenience attends it, which is, that it would require for its Defense, a more numerous Garrison than could be spared from the Army. For it would require at least 2000 Men; as, from the Badness of the soil, the Enemy's Cannon would soon make great Destruction, which must be repaired every Night, to prevent the works from being stormed.

3. As to the execution of these Works, I find it to be without Judgment.
The Planks and Piles to support the sand are not half thick enough. The Piles instead of being inclined to bear against the Bank, have been fixed perpendicular and are already overturned. Instead of placing the Batteries destined to fire on the River, on the Border of the Scarp, they have placed them 7 or 8 Fathoms back, which removes them farther from their Object, and exposes them to the Enemy's attempt at the Bottom of the Scarp. And suppose the Works completed, only one Piece of Cannon can do Execution. Instead of making use of the Ground which forms the Border of the Scarp and which is firm on the superfices, and supported at least for some Depth by the Roots of Trees which grew there, they have raised a great Part of the Breastwork with loose Sand in the manner before mentioned, and have taken the Trouble to sink a Ditch, which might have been spared as the Scarp answered the Purpose ....
To defend the Chain of Chevaux de Frize which bars the River opposite to the Fort, all dependence for the present must be on the FloatingBatteries and Gondolas which are ready, or which can soon be so. Some use, however, can be made of a Part of the Fort, of which we have been speaking: and for this Purpose there should be a Battery fixed in each of the two Demi-Bastions on the side of the River. And by cutting those two Demi-Bastions by the Gorge and the angle of the Flank, they will each be transformed into a Redoubt with four Fronts. Each of these Redoubts may be secured against a Coup de Main by covering them with a double Ditch and Pallisades in the Bottom of the Ditch. It will then be necessary to level all those Parts of the Fort which may serve to cover the Enemy. These two Works by means of 1500 or 2000 Labourers well directed may be executed in 20 Days: and in my Opinion this is all that can be done in the present situation of affairs ....

The Fort

The Fort [Mifflin] is badly situated; the Battery which forms its principal object is improperly directed, which renders Half the Guns useless. The Embrazures are badly constructed, too open on the inside, and not sufficiently open without: some are directed obliquely without any motive; the interior Siopings are too straight, and by this means begin already to tumbledown.
This Fort cannot prevent the Passage of the Enemy, and when they have passed, it can be of no use; consequently it can answer no valuable Purpose.

Fort of Red-bank

This Fort is better conceived, directed, and executed than either of those above mentioned. It does the more Honour to Colonel BulI,2 as he had no other assistance than natural good sence unenlightened by Theory. This is perceivable from a View of it. There are indeed Faults in the Plan, and in the Execution, but they do not render it useless as the two former Forts. If we may judge by the Proportion of the work already finished, it is reasonable to expect the whole will be in a State of Defence in the course of a Fort night. What unfortunately renders this Fort of little or no Consequence is this; its object is, and can be, no other than to prevent the Enemy from taking possession of the Highth upon which it is placed, in order to establish Batteries and thereby oblige the Gallies and Floating Batteries employed in supporting the Chain of Chevaux de Frize, to retreat. But this case could never happen, unless the Enemy should be exposed to a Fire from the Floating Batteries and Gallies, which they could not silence with their ships .... But the situation of the Place will not permit such an idea; for the River is here so wide that if the States had four times as many Gallies, Ships and Batteries as they have at this place and above it, the Enemy, we must think, would still have a superior Fire, as the width of the River would allow them to employ a greater number of Ships .... Therefore I look upon this Fort as useless with respect to the Object for which it was intended, viz., to contribute in obstructing the Passage of the River, and preventing the Enemy from possessing the Highth it commands. This Passage is much too wide to be defended by the present means. I would therefore advise to carryall the means of Defense to the Passage at Billingsport. This place is incomparably more capable of support, and it is better to make a respectable stand in one place than to defend two in an indifferent manner .... The River [is] much narrower in this place than in that of which we have been speaking. The Gallies and Batteries may more easily make Head against the Enemy who will not be able to make so great a Fire, and will be obliged to bear a much nearer one, and better supported, than could be opposed to them at Red Bank. The Cannon at this Fort might partly serve for the Batteries at Billingsport. I would not, however, advise to demolish the Battery at Red Bank, but to leave there two or three of the poorest of the Cannon.
I would also advise to remove from this Line no more Chevaux de Frize than would be judged necessary to secure by three Rows, the Passage of Billingsport.
I also advise to preserve Colonel Bull's Fort [Red Bank]. Thereby you may induce the Enemy to believe they would have a second Line of obstacles to encounter, after they had surmounted the first; and besides for another Reason, which appears to me a very important one especially in the present Circumstances of Affairs, the Government would escape the Censure inconsideration and mistakes, which the evil-minded are always ready to pass, and the People to adopt, when they 'see Works which have been erected with much Labour and Expense pulled down ....
-Pennsylvania Magazine 24:343-47.

Engineers of Independence

1. 1. The report was actually submitted June 21.
2. 2. In February 1777 the Pennsylvania Council of Safety appointed Col. John Bull to overseethe works at Billingsport.